NASA has completed the investigation into the damage sustained last year at its 70-meter radio-frequency antenna, known as the Deep Space Station 14 (DSS-14), at the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex near Barstow, California. The agency has classified the event as a Type A mishap based on the total cost of damages. The antenna will remain offline to complete repairs and previously scheduled upgrades.

“NASA takes safety and any departure from established procedures seriously, and the investigation at Goldstone made clear that we must strengthen our processes. We are acting on the investigation’s findings,” said Joel Montalbano, acting associate administrator for NASA’s Space Operations Mission Directorate at the agency’s headquarters in Washington. “We will update and improve procedures, rebuild core in-house capabilities, and reinforce operational discipline across the Deep Space Network. NASA remains focused on learning from this and modernizing systems, so DSS-14 and the broader network are ready to support our ambitious future missions.”

On Sept. 16, 2025, the DSS‑14 antenna over‑rotated while actively tracking the Juno mission, placing excessive stress on cabling and associated structural supports. Water lines tied to the antenna’s fire‑suppression system also were damaged, causing significant flooding in the facility. There were no injuries.

NASA convened a Mishap Investigation Board, bringing together experts from across the agency to examine the technical, organizational, and cultural factors behind the incident. The board conducted on‑site inspections, interviews, and detailed reviews of technical documentation and operational logs from all three Deep Space Network sites. The board completed its final report in April and submitted it for agency concurrence.

The investigation issued findings and recommendations that emphasize training, technical rigor, operational procedures, system design, clear roles and responsibilities, and safety assurance. At the same time, teams already are applying lessons learned across all network sites to improve operational consistency. These steps will help bolster the network and reduce the risk of future mishaps.

In its final report, the board found the mishap primarily stemmed from software weaknesses, human error, and an undetected failure in the antenna’s hydraulic limit system. Investigators determined an electrical issue at the antenna the previous day caused the control system to misreport the antenna’s rotation state, an issue that went unnoticed and triggered multiple limit-stops during the Juno track on Sept. 16. While working to identify the limit-stop problem, operators performed several troubleshooting steps that inadvertently bypassed software and hardware safeguards, which ultimately led to the over-rotation incident. After flooding in the antenna base was observed, operators attempted to stow the antenna as a safety precaution, however, because the system had already passed the rotation limits, this action drove the antenna further into over‑rotation, causing additional damage.

Additionally, the investigation found the antenna’s hydraulic limit system, its final mechanical safeguard, was inoperable on Sept. 16 after being damaged in an undocumented prior incident. The system also had not been adequately tested for an undetermined period of time.

Investigators also concluded workplace culture pressured operators to work as expeditiously as possible, often stretching beyond their usual roles, expertise, and training, to keep the antenna operating. The board states the cultural conditions observed at Goldstone were not present at the network’s other sites, where roles and responsibilities are followed more consistently. Other contributing factors outlined in the report include inadequate procedures, reliance on undocumented practices and tacit knowledge, and gaps in the antenna’s control logic. NASA will accept this as the final report.

The agency estimates repairs will cost between $4.1 and $4.6 million, with a final figure to be determined after the antenna’s systems are fully assessed. The antenna will remain offline as it enters its previously scheduled extended maintenance and upgrade period, originally set to begin in August and expected to be completed by October 2028. These upgrades are part of broader network improvements essential to supporting future exploration and science missions, as well as enhancing the nation’s planetary defense capabilities.

“We are committed to learning everything we can from this incident, and we’ve already begun putting those lessons into practice,” said Kevin Coggins, deputy associate administrator for NASA’s SCaN (Space Communications and Navigation) Program at the agency’s headquarters. “Our teams are working to strengthen and standardize processes and training across all three network sites to ensure it remains resilient, consistent, and ready to support the next generation of missions. Every challenge is an opportunity to improve, and this is no exception.”

The Deep Space Network continues to provide full coverage for more than 40 missions despite the DSS‑14 incident. The network’s 13 other antennas, located at complexes in California, Australia, and Spain, are supporting all tracking needs without interruption. A dedicated scheduling team allocates antenna time across the network to meet each mission’s science and data‑return objectives. The team also maintains continuous coverage when an antenna goes offline for maintenance or an unexpected outage.

To view the report, which includes redactions to protect proprietary and privacy-sensitive material, visit:

https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/dss14-mishap-investigation-board-report-signed-final-redacted-hm-tagged-508.pdf?emrc=74c749